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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ERIN JO CHAMBERS,

:

Plaintiff, Appellant
and Cross-Appellee,

:

v.
:

Case No. 940210-CA
Priority No. 15

THOMAS D. CHAMBERS,
Defendant, Appellee
and Cross-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has
jurisdiction to review all final judgments and orders of
the District Court involving domestic relations cases
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953,
as amended) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE PERMITTED AN

ADDITIONAL HEARING TO CONSIDER THE ISSUES ON REMAND.
THERE WAS NO REASONABLE BASIS TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF
ALIMONY PREVIOUSLY AWARDED TO MRS. CHAMBERS.
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IF A

reduced from $5,000.00 to $3,000.00 per month and then
only terminate upon the occurrence of remarriage, death
or operation of law.

The original Decree terminated

alimony entirely at the conclusion of six years.
On September 15f 1993, the parties' counsel met with
the Court requesting additional clarification regarding
the effective date of the reduction of alimony.
Mr. Chambers was contending that the reduction should be
retroactive

to

the

original

entitling him to a refund.

Decree

date,

thereby

The Court took that matter

under advisement and issued a supplemental Memorandum on
November 19, 1993, establishing the effective date as of
the July 9, 1993 Memorandum Decision.
The

defendant

thereafter

filed

a

Motion

for

Reconsideration/Rehearing which was heard on
February 28, 1994 and denied. At that hearing, the Court
agreed that it would sign plaintiff's proposed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Remand which
were in fact signed on March 2, 1994.
Mr. Chambers filed his appeal on March 29, 1994 and
Mrs. Chambers filed her cross-appeal on April 7, 1994.
III.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.
The relevant portions of the Court's Order on Remand
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which form the basis of the issues on appeal and crossappeal are:
A.
from

The Court reduced Mrs. Chambers' alimony

$10,000.00

per

month

to

$7,000.00

per

month

effective with the Court's Memorandum Decision dated
July 12, 1993, which was to continue for the balance of
the original three-year rehabilitative period.
B. Beginning with the fourth year, the alimony
was to be reduced from the original $5,000.00 per month
amount to $3,000.00 per month.
C.

The alimony would only terminate upon the

occurrence of remarriage, death or operation of law,
rather than at the end of six years as originally
ordered.
D.

The $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at

the time of trial was affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the original trial, the parties stipulated that
Mr. Chambers would pay $1,500.00 per month per child for
the three minor child or a total of $4,500.00 per month
child support. (T - Vol. IV pp. 52, 53)
The Court ordered Mr. Chambers to pay alimony in the
sum of $10,000.00 per month for three years commencing
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November 1, 1990 and $5,000.00 per month thereafter for
three years commencing November 1, 1993. The alimony was
then ordered to cease at the conclusion of the six-year
period or earlier if the plaintiff died, remarried or
cohabited. (R - 394)

The Court further required

Mr. Chambers to pay $10,000.00 to assist Mrs. Chambers in
the payment of her attorney fees in addition to those
sums he had already paid to assist her in the preparation
and prosecution of the divorce. (R - 396)
Mrs. Chambers appealed the amount of alimony awarded
her, its automatic reduction after three years and its
termination
Court's

after six years.

partial

She also appealed

reimbursement

of

the

attorney

the
fees

incurred by her.
Mr. Chambers appealed the award of alimony in its
entirety and the award of attorney fees.
This Court's decision in Chambers v. Chambers,
840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992), reversed and remanded in
part and affirmed in part.

With respect to alimony, the

trial Court was instructed to:
1.

Make further findings to address

Mrs. Chambers' level of education,
matters

concerning

her

employability.
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health

immediate

or

and

other

eventual

2.

Further articulate the automatic reduction

of alimony based on the "substantial income from assets
that have been awarded to (Mrs. Chambers)".
3. Explain why Mr. Chambers has the ability to
pay.
4. Reconsider the Court's apparent inclusion of
children's expenses in the alimony award and to adjust
child support if necessary to cover their expenses.
With respect to attorney fees, the trial Court was
instructed to:
1.
plaintiff's

Consider
attorney

the partial
fees

based

reimbursement
on

the

of

standards

announced in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) .
After remand, Mr. Chambers filed a Memorandum on
Remand contending that sufficient evidence existed in the
record

to

support

supplemental

findings

and

that

additional evidence would not be necessary. Mr. Chambers
also submitted proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce NUNC PRO
TUNC to November 30, 1990.1

1

Defendant's Memorandum on Remand has not been paginated by
the court clerk. It is in the trial record in a bound volume and
was filed with the District Court of Weber County on
January 20, 1993. Mr. Chambers' proposed Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc do appear in the record.
(R - pp. 967-975)
-7-

Mrs. Chambers filed a remand response Memorandum.2
Mr.

Chambers

filed

a

reply

to

Mrs. Chambers

response. (R - 703-711)
A hearing was conducted on June 7, 1993.3
evidence was taken at this hearing.

No

The Court merely

heard argument of counsel concerning their respective
positions.
It was the opinion of Mr. Chambers' that the trial
record was complete in every material respect relevant to
the Court of Appeals' Order on Remand and the trial Court
could merely supplement its findings based on the record
already in existence. (T - 2, 3)
Mrs. Chambers argued that while some aspects of the
remand requirements could be adjusted by a review of the
trial transcript, in order to adequately reconsider
issues directed by the Court of Appeals, some further
evidence would be necessary to conform to those remand
instructions. (T - 19)

Specifically, it was contended

that additional evidence would be necessary concerning
her attorney fees to cure any deficiency that might have
2

It was not until the preparation of this Brief that
Mrs. Chambers' counsel discovered that her original remand response
Memorandum was not contained in the Court's file.
3

All references to the transcript of this hearing are to
page numbers utilized by the court reporter. It has not otherwise
been paginated by the court clerk.
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existed in the record since it was the Court's suggestion
that evidence would not be necessary at the time of
trial. (T - 26-28)
Mrs. Chambers' also pointed out that her needs and
expenses concerning her gross alimony award were premised
at trial upon her ability to be successful in a property
award of Mr. Chambers' future value in his basketball
contract and absent that, her alimony award request
needed to be supplemented to take into account other
aspects

of

articulated

her
in

standard
her

of

trial

living

exhibit

that
number

were

not

11,

i.e.

investments and retirement accounts and benefits.4
asked

the

Court

to

permit

additional

evidence

She
to

articulate those needs. (T - 30-32)
It was also contended by Mrs. Chambers' that the
recent case of Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585 (Utah
App. 1993), required the trial Court to equalize the
post-divorce standard of living. Godfrey quoted Chambers
v. Chambers as authority. Mrs. Chambers argued that the
trial Court had failed to do this in the original
decision. Mrs. Chambers further claimed that her exhibit
11 was nothing more than her bare living necessities for
4

An issue in the original appeal was whether or not
Mr. Chambers' future value in his basketball contract was a marital
asset. The Court of Appeals held it was not.
-9-

the six-month period of separation preceding the divorce
and that to fashion an award that would equalize postdivorce standards of living, would require additional
testimony. (T - 33, 34)
The Court of Appeals in Chambers v. Chambers, supra,
had suggested that upon remand, the District Court:
Must reconsider its apparent inclusion
of the children's expenses in
Mrs. Chambers' alimony award. In its
findings, the Court acknowledges that
many of the expenses listed in
Mrs. Chambers' request for $10,000.00
per month alimony were expenses that
applied to the children. In view of the
District Court's award of $4,500.00 per
month in child support, it is plainly
inequitable that Mr. Chambers' alimony
payment includes the children's expenses.
If the child support that the parties
stipulated to is insufficient to cover
the children's expenses, then the Court
must award sufficient child support, not
increase alimony to include the children's
expenses. (See footnote 1 to Decision)
At this initial remand hearing, Mrs. Chambers also
requested that the Court permit a brief hearing so she
could explain her exhibit of needs and list of expenses
and respond to what the Court of Appeals felt had been
overlapped alimony and child support.5

(T - 34-36)

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court said:
5

Mr. Chambers' Memorandum on Remand contained an analysis of
what he believed were overlapped expenses for the children and
Mrs. Chambers. If that analysis were accepted, the child support
should have been increased.
-10-

I don't see the necessity for the
retrial of the case. I think that the
Court has heard the evidence and the
record is available to me. And I
believe that the Court is able to
follow the directions of the Court of
Appeals in handing down a new Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
relating specifically to the three
issues: alimony, attorney fees and
the division of the retirement.
(T - 54, 55)6
The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on
July 12, 1993. With respect to the issue of alimony, the
Court said:
In reconsidering the alimony award
in the original decree, it occurs to
me that there were miscalculations. I
found that plaintiff's exhibit 11
correctly reflected the needs of the
plaintiff and her children at about
$10,000 per month. That amount fails
to consider her additional need of
health and accident insurance
(previously provided by the defendant)
and money to offset her tax liability
for her receipt of alimony. I
recognized that there were substantial
children's expenses involved in the
exhibit 11 needs assessment, but felt
that the child support nearly equaled
the amount of children's expense alleged
on exhibit 11 and the $4,500 child
support was included in the income
calculations.
In recalculating the alimony, if we
accept the expenses of exhibit 11 and
add the expense of health and accident
insurance and taxes on the alimony
paid, and then deduct the child support,
6

The parties have not re-appealed the issue of retirement.
-11-

that means the plaintiff has need of
about $7,000 to maintain her prior
standard of living.
This ruling does not factor in any
consideration of the plaintiffs
ability to provide for herself or
money received as returns on
investments from assets awarded as a
part of the property division. It is
the intent of the Court that the
plaintiff should have the initial three
years as a rehabilitative period to:
marshall her assets, learns to invest
appropriately, make decisions about her
future, prepare for future employment,
become settled, etc. Thereafter, the
Court adopts as its finding, paragraphs
10 and 11 from the Defendant's
Supplemental Findings of Fact, etc.
relating to the plaintiffs ability to
care for herself, and based upon that
finding, imputes income to the plaintiff
of $736 per month.
The plaintiff received as her share of
the property division $1,479,578.
Realistically, it would not be fair to
consider that figure as her investment
base. There are obviously attorneys'
fees and costs of the proceeding, as
well as taxes to pay, etc. She has
also requested that we deduct from her
investment base her purchase of a home
and the debt by her family. It would
not be appropriate to allow the plaintiff
to remove the home from her investment
base and also allow her to claim rent
expense of over $1,000 per month.
Figuring a 4% return on her investment
base, the imputed income of $736, and
the child support, the alimony award
should be reduced at the end of three
years to $3,000 per month.

-12-

I had previously ordered termination of
alimony at the end of three years. That
decision was based on the fact that when
the defendant is through with basketball,
his ability to produce income is frankly
no better than the plaintiffs. His
present earning ability is based strictly
upon his status as a professional athlete.
In retrospect, that is not entirely
correct, for it fails to consider the
income he will earn in the meantime. His
investment base, considering his interim
income, should exceed hers by several
times, giving him by far a superior
ability to provide on-going assistance.
The alimony then should not terminate
except upon the occurrence of remarriage,
death, etc. (R - 732-734)
With respect to the issue of attorney fees, the
Court said:
The final issue requiring consideration
is that of the attorneys' fee award.
The stipulation at trial, as the court
understood it, was that if Mr. Dolowitz
were called to testify, he would verify
the material contained in plaintiff's
exhibit 17 and express the opinion that
the time and costs involved were
reasonable taking into account the
complexity and seriousness of the issues
involved. The defendant did not
stipulate the charges or time were
reasonable, but only that would be
Mr. Dolowitz's testimony.
The exhibit (17) contained a summary
sheet of the gross charges, a breakdown
of the hourly rate of persons from
Mr. Dolowitz's office working upon the
plaintiff's case, a monthly summary
of charges, times and persons, and
finally a day-by-day account of date,
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attorney, service description, hours
and charge (amount). In considering
the complexity of the issues, the
number of hearings, the conferences,
the resolution of issues, the
animosity between the parties, the
amounts of money and property, etc.,
the Court believes the charges were
not unreasonable.
The second issue relates to the fact
that the defendant with a multiple
million dollar income clearly has
the ability to assist the plaintiff
with her attorneys fees. In fact, in
a comparison of the resources of the
two parties, he is in a much superior
position.
The final prong of the "Bell" (810
P.2d 489) analysis relates to the
ability of the plaintiff to pay her
own attorneys' fees. It is clear
with the distribution of almost a
million and a half dollars in assets,
that the plaintiff could pay her own
attorney. However, the Court was
concerned about the necessity of her
being able to maintain an appropriate
investment base. I was aware that
there would be substantial inroads
into that base by reason of taxes,
the debt owed by her family (which
is likely uncollectible), court
costs, witness' fees, attorneys'
fees, etc. In the interest of her
being able to maintain a base
sufficient to provide an appropriate
income, I felt she needed some
assistance with the fees. I ruled
the attorneys' fees previously paid,
have been paid with marital assets
not to be considered in the final
distribution, and awarded her an
additional $10,000 to apply to her
attorneys' fees. Based upon the
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above considerations, I find that
the plaintiff has need of assistance
with her attorneys' fees. (R - 734-736)
The parties' counsel met with the Court on
September 15, 1993 requesting additional clarification
regarding the effective date of the reduction of alimony.
The Court took that matter under advisement and issued a
Supplemental Memorandum on November 19, 1993.
Supplemental Memorandum, the Court said:
In the Court's reconsideration of
alimony in response to an order of
the appellate Court, I had failed
to specify disposition of the
overpayment from the time of the
original decree to the time of the
order of the Court of Appeals.
Upon reflection, that failure may
have been a result of a subconscious
desire to not address the issue in
hopes it would go away.
To require the plaintiff to repay
those overpayments would seriously
affect her ability to maintain her
standard of living.
It would undermine further her
investment base to a very serious
extent. In addition, in dividing
the estate, we had awarded to her
an obligation of her family which
at this point seems unlikely to be
collected. The decision to loan the
money to the plaintiff's brother
appears to have been a joint decision.
The diminution of her estate by both
the loan and repayment of alimony
based upon the Court's mistake,
somehow seems unfair.
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In the

The Court accordingly declines to
order repayment based upon the
equities of property division,
earning ability, etc. (R - 766-767)
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on Remand were prepared.

Mr. Chambers filed a

Motion for Reconsideration/Rehearing.

A hearing was

conducted February 28, 1994. No evidence was taken, but
the Court heard argument of counsel.7

At that hearing,

Mr. Chambers' counsel argued that there was no evidence
in the record to consider Mrs. Chambers' standard of
living that would justify the Court failing to order her
to repay the overpayment of alimony. (T - 5)
Mr. Chambers' counsel also argued there was no evidence
in the record that would justify extending the alimony
beyond the original six-year period. (T - 13)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court stated:
The whole basis for the court's
decision concerning the pay-back
issue is one of equity. While I
recognize that there's some real
justice in what you have suggested,
it all comes back to the issue of
what's really fair. And that's
where I kept getting hung up.
Frankly, Mr. Florence, if you feel
that the concept of retroactivity
is more defensible, I think based
7

All references to the transcript of this hearing are to
page numbers utilized by the court reporter. It has not otherwise
been paginated by the court clerk.
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upon the Court's previous finding —
and I'll be candid. I hadn't
considered — even thought about that.
I guess I presumed that it would be
required of the Court to make a
ruling concerning whether she has to
pay it back or not. I don't think
I'd considered the possibility of
just saying it's not retroactive,
although I guess the net effect of
saying she doesn't have to pay it
back is that it not be retroactive.
If you feel that's a more defensible
position, I have no objection to
making a specific finding that it
isn't retroactive.
And I recognize the justice of what
you're saying, but we're not dealing
with a contract matter where somebody
has borrowed money from somebody else
and now they don't have to pay it
back. We're dealing with the division
of assets and with standards of living
in a divorce action which is a whole
different ball game.
And while I have some sympathy for,
you know, the plea that you've made,
it just doesn't seem fair. Just
doesn't seem fair.
If you want me, Mr. Florence, to make
specific findings as you've previously
proposed or if you'd like to redo
findings concerning that specific
aspect of retroactivity, I'll be glad
to consider it either way. (T - 34-36)
The Court agreed to sign the proposed Findings,
Conclusions and Order on Remand previously submitted by
Mrs. Chambers' counsel. (T - 39)

They were in fact

signed on March 2, 1994. (R - 921-932)
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From these Decisions, both parties have filed their
appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
To better address the issues on remand, the trial
Court should have conducted a brief evidentiary hearing.
The Court's Order on Remand arbitrarily reduced the prior
award of alimony.

If any change in the original Decree

was justified, the alimony should have been increased.
Mrs. Chambers' original request for alimony was premised
upon her belief that she would receive as part of her
property settlement a portion of the value of
Mr. Chambers' future basketball contract. Absent that,
her request for alimony needed to be increased. When the
trial Court and Court of Appeals rejected her claim for
an interest in the basketball contract, the Court should
have considered her additional needs not covered by her
alimony request at trial.
The reduction of alimony for the first three years
was not based on any facts. The Court apparently erred
in its math. The reduction of alimony after three years
was also without any factual basis and failed to even
come close to maintaining Mrs. Chambers' marital standard
of living or equalizing the post-divorce standards of
living.
-18-

Since the Court reduced her alimony, presumably on
the basis that the other assets awarded her would assist
with her needs, it was inappropriate for the trial Court
to only make a nominal award of attorney fees.

If

attorney fees were justified, there was no articulated
basis to deny her request for full reimbursement.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE PERMITTED
AN ADDITIONAL HEARING TO CONSIDER THE
ISSUES ON REMAND. THERE WAS NO
REASONABLE BASIS TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT
OF ALIMONY PREVIOUSLY AWARDED TO
MRS. CHAMBERS. IF A REDUCTION WAS
JUSTIFIED, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE
TO REQUIRE MRS. CHAMBERS TO REIMBURSE
MR. CHAMBERS.
In the original appeal, Mrs. Chambers was arguing
that the future contract payments for Mr. Chambers to
play basketball for the Phoenix Suns was a marital asset
which should be subject to division. The trial Court had
concluded that the future earnings of Mr. Chambers were
not a property right subject to division.
Both at trial and on appeal, Mrs. Chambers urged
that if the contract payments were not to be divided,
then the large disparity in the parties' incomes should
be equitably treated by a larger alimony award.

-19-

The Court of Appeals in Chambers v. Chambers, 840
P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992) , held that Mr. Chambers' future
contract

payments were not marital

subject to division.

(At page 845)

property

rights

With respect to

alimony, the Court criticized the trial Court's findings
as being insufficient.

The trial Court had awarded

Mrs. Chambers alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per month
which would continue for three years, after which the
alimony would be reduced to $5,000.00 per month for an
additional three years, after which it would terminate.
The Court of Appeals stated that the second prong of
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989),
that is the ability of Mrs. Chambers to produce a
sufficient income for herself, had not been addressed.
Specifically, Mrs. Chambers' level of education, health
and other matters concerning her immediate or eventual
employability, had not been commented upon.
(At page 843)
The Court of Appeals also said that the third prong
of Schindler, that is the ability of the responding
spouse to provide support, had not been met in as much as
the Court only stated that:
ability to pay".

(At page 843)

-20-

"The defendant has the

The Court of Appeals further held that the trial
Court's reliance upon "substantial income from assets
that have been awarded to her" as justification to reduce
and

subsequently

terminate

without further explanation.

alimony

was

insufficient

(At page 843)

Additionally, by footnote, the Court of Appeals
said:
The District Court must reconsider
its apparent inclusion of the children's
expenses in Mrs. Chambers' alimony award.
In its findings, the Court acknowledges
that many of the expenses listed in
Mrs. Chambers' request for $10,000.00
per month alimony were expenses that
applied to the children. In view of the
District Court's award of $4,500.00 per
month in child support, it is plainly
inequitable that Mr. Chambers' alimony
payment includes the children's expenses.
If the child support that the parties
stipulated to is insufficient to cover
the children's expenses, then the Court
must award sufficient child support, not
increase alimony to include the children's
expenses. (At page 843)
Over the objection of Mrs. Chambers, these remand
requirements were only considered by the trial Court by
arguments of counsel at the hearing on June 7, 1993.
With

respect

to the direction

that

the Court

enter

additional findings to address Mrs. Chambers' level of
education,

health

and

other

matters

concerning

immediate or eventual employability, Mrs. Chambers
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her

conceded that considerable testimony was received at
trial

concerning

her

education,

health

and

past

employment history, but contended that no testimony was
elicited at trial regarding her future employability. In
any event, in the Court's Memorandum Decision issued
July

12, 1993, the Court

paragraphs

10

and

11

adopted

from

as

its

defendant's

findings
proposed

Supplemental Findings of Fact, etc. relating to the
plaintiff's ability to care for herself and based upon
those findings, imputed income to Mrs. Chambers of
$736.00 per month.

In this regard, the Supplemental

Findings appear in paragraph 10 of the Court's Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Remand.
(R - 925)
With respect to the requirement that the Court give
further explanation to justify a reduction of alimony,
the Court had said in its original Decision that
Mrs. Chambers would be able to earn substantial income
from the assets awarded to her and used this as its
justification for first reducing the alimony after three
years and then terminating it altogether after six.

On

remand, the Court said that the reduction after three
years was based on a 4% return on Mrs. Chambers'
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investment based and the imputed additional income of
$736.00 per month.

After agreeing that the property

award to Mrs. Chambers should not be totally considered
her true investment base, the Court made no further
finding as to what her investment base should be.

The

original decision to terminate alimony altogether was
based upon the fact that when Mr. Chambers was through
with basketball, his ability to produce income would be
no better than the plaintiffs. In retrospect, the trial
Court concluded that was not entirely correct for it
failed to consider the income he would earn in the
meantime which was substantially greater than
Mrs. Chambers, thereby giving him a far superior ability
to provide on-going assistance. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the alimony should not terminate except
upon the occurrence of remarriage and death.
(R - 732-734)
With respect to the Court of Appeals' direction that
the trial Court explain why the defendant had the ability
to payf the Court on remand failed to address this issue
entirely.

What we do know from the original trial was

that in the first year following the trialf
Mr. Chambers was to receive $116,667.00 per month gross.
In the second year, that figure was to increase to
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$141,667.00 per month gross. In the third year following
the trial, Mr. Chambers was to receive $166,667.00 per
month gross.

Not taking into account what has in fact

happened to Mr. Chambers since the divorce trial, the
contract presented at trial showed that in the fourth
year

following

$47,917.00

the

trial,

he

would

per month which would

remainder of the six-year period.

be

receiving

continue

for the

While the Court has

not specifically made findings that Mr. Chambers had the
ability to pay the alimony that was ordered, it has
recently been held in Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah
App. 1994), that unstated findings of the Court could be
implied if it was reasonable to assume that the Court
actually considered the evidence and necessarily made the
finding to resolve the controversy, but simply failed to
record the factual determination that it made.

In this

particular case, there was no disagreement as to what
Mr. Chambers' gross income was going to be pursuant to
his contract with the Phoenix Suns and at no time did he
ever suggest he lacked the ability to pay reasonable
alimony to Mrs. Chambers. The finding of Mr. Chambers''
ability to pay should therefore be implied.
It is the footnote to Chambers v. Chambers, supra,
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which caused the trial Court to recalculate alimony and
is the primary basis for both parties' appeals,
Mr. Chambers claims that the recalculation should result
in a refund to him and Mrs. Chambers claims that the
Court should not have reduced the alimony at all, but
increased it or increased child support or both.

The

footnote directed the trial Court to reconsider its
apparent inclusion of children's expenses in
Mrs. Chambers' alimony award.
In defendant's Memorandum on Remand, Mr. Chambers
argued that Mrs. Chambers' exhibit 11 which itemized
expenses of $9,997.73 per month, was the amount necessary
to cover her and the children's expenses. Mr. Chambers
then detailed what he believed to be the children's
expenses actually implicit in exhibit 11 and concluded
that

$4,783.36

should

be

attributed

to

children's

expenses and $5,214.37 was Mrs. Chambers' net request for
alimony.
should

If this argument were accepted, child support
have

been

increased

when

the

alimony

was

decreased.
Mrs. Chambers' trial exhibit 11 is attached as an
addendum to this Brief.

As can be seen, her total

support request was actually $14,060.00 which included
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$4,060.60 taxes that would be due on her alimony award of
$10,000.00 per month.

The parties had stipulated to a

total child support award of $1,500.00 per month per
child or a total of $4,500.00 and the $10,000.00 alimony
award originally given by the Court did nothing more than
meet Mrs. Chambers' requested

needs which

in

fact

included the needs for the children, but which altogether
would have justified a total $14,060.00 per month award.
Mr. Chambers has mis-stated the nature of
Mrs. Chambers' alimony request.

He has persisted in

suggesting that exhibit 11 was the maximum of her support
request and was representative of her marital standard of
living.

During her testimony in the original trial,

after reviewing her exhibit and the expenses listed, this
exchange occurred:
Q. Is this— and is there any
significant difference in the expenses
set out in Exhibit 11-P and those
you've spent during the marriage?
A.

Excuse me. Would you—

Q. Is this the same as you have
done during the marriage?
A. No.
Q.

No?

In what way is it different?

A. Well, I used to be able to take
the kids — we would-during the season
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we would fly back and forth and Tom
always paid for those type of things
and—and with this I could not do that
now.
Q. Is this less than the standard of
living you had during the marriage?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you think this is a reasonable
request that you're making?
A.

Yes

Q. Is there any component in Exhibit
11-P for investing or saving any money?
A.

No

Q. You—you were here when I addressed
an opening statement to the Court.
A. Yes.
Q. And said that we're dealing with
the problem of Mr. Chambers' future
earnings under the present five-year
contract.
A.

Yes

Q. If the Court were to determine
that those represent not property to be
dividedf but earnings, would you desire
more than—an alimony higher than 11-P
in order to deal with investing or putting
anything aside for yourself?
A* Yes*
(Transcript Volume II pages 12 and 13)
Mr. Chambers went into considerable detail citing
the record in an effort to show that Mrs. Chamber's
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stated needs, included expenses for the children.

He

acknowledged that her exhibit for expenses was based "on
a compilation of actual expenses during a six-month
period in 1990 just before trial", (page 8)

What is

obviously lacking in this approach and further points to
the necessity of an evidentiary hearing is that
Mrs. Chambers' compilation of actual expenses is based on
what she needed during a period of separation from
Mr. Chambers, pending the trial, when she was totally
dependant on him for her needs.

It did not reflect in

any measure, the standard of living the two of them
enjoyed during the marriage, nor did it attempt to bring
into any parity their future standard of living.
For instance, there was no provision in
Mrs. Chambers' six-month actual living expense analysis
(Exhibit 11) for her own health insurance needs for the
future since Mr. Chambers had been paying them; no
provision for any extended travel or trips, something
Mr. Chambers could afford and obviously enjoyed himself
but not calculated for Mrs. Chambers; no provision for
tax preparation since Mr. Chambers had been paying; no
ability for her to buy expensive gifts for the children,
something that only Mr. Chambers has been able to do
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since the divorce; no provision for Mrs. Chambers to make
real estate or stock investments, to create a retirement
plan or savings, something the parties obviously did
during their marriage but Mrs. Chambers cannot now do.
The parties stipulated to $4,500.00 per month for
the child support and the Court ordered $10,000.00 per
month for alimony which was to reduce to $5,000.00 in
November, 1993.

The Court did nothing more than cover

Mrs. Chambers' six-month pre-divorce expenses by the
initial support award.
In the Court's Memorandum Decision of July 12, 1993,
it said:
In recalculating the alimony, if we
accept the expenses of exhibit 11
and add the expenses of health and
accident insurance and taxes on the
alimony paid and then deduct the
child support, that means the
plaintiff has need of about $7,000.00
to maintain her prior standard of
living. (R - 733)
This simply does not add up.

If the Court accepts

the expenses of exhibit 11, adds the expenses of health
and accident insurance and taxes paid on alimony and
deducted the $4,500.00 child support, it would still
justify the original $10,000.00 per month alimony award.
There is no factual or mathematical basis for the Court
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to have reduced the alimony to $7,000.00•
It should also be kept in mind that Mrs. Chambers
was couching the alimony request stated in exhibit 11 in
the context of a request for a division of Mr. Chambers'
future contract earnings.

If that were not awarded to

her, then it was her request that a higher alimony award
be provided in order to allow her to invest and put aside
things for herself such as Mr. Chambers would be able to
do following the trial. As previously stated, exhibit 11
was nothing more than a compilation of the actual
expenses incurred by Mrs. Chambers during a six-month
period in 1990 just before trial. It did not reflect her
true standard of living while residing with Mr. Chambers.
It certainly did nothing by way of equalizing postdivorce standards of living.
Following the original Chambers decision, this Court
decided Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App.
1993).

In Godfrey, the Court held that an alimony award

should, after a marriage, and to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective standards of living and
maintain them at a level as close as possible to the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Chambers
was cited as authority for this proposition.
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(At page

589) The trial Court's original $10,000.00 alimony award
and indeed the reduction to $7,000.00 did not reflect in
any measure the standard of living the two of them
enjoyed during the marriage, nor did it attempt to bring
into any parity their future standard of living.

As

stated above, there was no provision for any extended
travel or trips for Mrs. Chambers, something Mr. Chambers
could afford to do, no ability for her to buy expensive
gifts for the children, no provision to make real estate
or stock investments or to create a retirement plan or
savings for herself. In light of the assets that existed
at the conclusion of the marriage, asset accumulation was
something the parties were obviously capable of doing
during the marriage, but which Mrs. Chambers could not
subsequently do based on the alimony award granted her.
In fact, the Court was relying on the assets awarded
Mrs. Chambers as a basis for setting the alimony.
In short, the trial Court should have increased the
alimony rather than decreased it and, if anything, should
have increased the amount of child support since, by
Mr. Chambers' own analysis, the amount of money being
expended for the children's needs pursuant to exhibit 11
exceeded the $4,500.00 per month that was stipulated to
by the parties.
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The Court claimed that its new ruling reducing the
alimony from $10,000.0 to $7,000.00 per month for the
balance of the first three-year period did not factor in
any consideration of Mrs. Chambers'' ability to provide
for herself or the money she received as returns on
investments from assets awarded her as part of the
property division. In this regard, the Court said that:
It is the intent of the Court that the
plaintiff should have the initial
three years as a rehabilitative period.
To: marshall her assets, learn to invest
appropriately, make decisions about her
future, prepare for future employment,
become settled, etc. (R - 733)
The Court did use her "investment base" and an
additional imputed income to reduce the alimony after
three years. The Court of Appeals specifically directed
the trial Court to articulate any reduction of alimony
based on assets awarded Mrs. Chambers.
Mr. Chambers has spent considerable time and detail
discussing Mrs. Chambers' share of the property division
totaling

$1,479,578.00.

The

Court

realized

that

realistically it would not be fair to consider that
figure as her investment base (R - 733), but did not
further articulate what an appropriate investment base
would be.

The Court suggested that a 4% return on an
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investment base and the imputed income of $736.00 per
month

and

the child

support

justified

the

further

reduction of the alimony award to $3,000.00 per month at
the end of three years. There is no further articulation
as to how this sum was arrived at or what the true
investment base would be.

This was one of the reasons

that Mrs. Chambers was urging an additional factual
hearing to determine the true investment base that was
income producing.

For instance, some of the annuities

awarded to her have not yet been received because of
financial difficulties of one of the entities.

She has

been heavily taxed on other annuities actually paid and
she incurred substantially higher attorney fees and
expert witness fees than were originally anticipated or
testified to at the time of trial. She would also have
a substantial tax obligation on her share of the Seattle
Supersonics payments awarded to her.
The Court's decision on remand reducing the sums of
alimony are not supported by adequate findings. Johnson
v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696 (Utah App. 1989). Automatically
decreasing alimony will not be justified unless specific
findings are made which would support the automatic
decrease.

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App.

1988).
-33-

In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991),
the defendant was claiming entitlement to a higher
alimony award because of the disparity in income, length
of marriage and respective earning abilities.
The Court said:
We believe it is consistent with
the goal of equalizing the parties'
post-divorce status to look to the
standard of living existing at or
near the time of trial in
determining alimony. This is
consonant with the treatment of
both marital property and child
support and is better designed to
equip both parties to go forward
with their separate lives with
relatively equal odds. . . In
so holding, we agree with the
dissenting opinion that
determining standard of living
is a "fact sensitive, subjective
task". We disagree, however,
that standard of living is
determined by actual expenses
alone. Those expenses may be
necessarily lower than needed
to maintain the appropriate
standard of living for various
reasons, including, possibly
lack of income.
The Court went on to say that:
The post-separation substantial
increase in plaintiffs income
was akin to deferred income,
at 1212.
Also, in Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P. 2d 538 (Utah
1991), the Supreme Court, in eliminating the theory of
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equitable restitution previously announced by the Court
of Appeals in Martinez, stated that while ordinarily the
needs of spouses for alimony are assessed in light of the
standard of living they had during the marriage, "in some
circumstances, it may be appropriate to try to equalize
the spouses' respective standards of living".

(At 540)

These cases suggest that if any change in the alimony
awarded Mrs. Chambers was to occur, it should have been
increased. Given the substantial differences in income,
Mrs. Chambers' post-divorce standard of living pales in
comparison to Mr. Chambers.
In the event this Court concludes that the trial
Court was justified in reducing the amount of alimony, it
would not be appropriate to require Mrs. Chambers to
reimburse the alimony actually paid by Mr. Chambers while
the first appeal was pending and that which would have
been paid by him had Judge Taylor's effective date of the
reduction been different.

In the original Decree,

Mr. Chambers' $10,000.00 per month alimony requirement
was to commence on November 1, 1990.

In the Court's

Order on Remand, it reduced the alimony to $7,000.00 per
month effective with the Court's Memorandum Decision
dated July 12, 1993.

In this regard, the Court has
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justified its conclusion that the effective date would
not be retroactive to November 1, 1990.

Judge Taylor

concluded a repayment obligation "would seriously affect
her ability to maintain her standard of living" and
"would further undermine her investment base to a very
serious extent".

This is a discretionary right of the

trial Court.
In Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App.
1994) , in considering an excessive attorney fee award,
this Court held that:
Trial Court's have considerable
discretion in determining the
financial interests of divorced
parties and that property and
alimony awards will be upheld on
appeal unless a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion
is demonstrated. Citing Hall v.
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App.
1993; Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072 (Utah 1985); Howell v. Howell,
806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App.) cert,
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
The effective date of the reduction of alimony was
clearly within the Court's discretion.

The Court has

articulated the reason for choosing an effective date
that would not require retroactive reimbursement.
If

this

Court

concludes

that

Judge

appropriately reduced the alimony, it would not
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Taylor

necessarily require that any retroactive application be
imposed.

There are two ways this could be approached*

If Judge Taylor considered the remand directions to
require him to re-visit the issue of alimony consistent
with those directions, then any subsequent order entered
by him could be considered as a new order regarding
alimony and its validity could be tested by normal
standards of appellate review, i.e. adequate findings
that do not constitute an abuse of discretion.
On the other handf if a modified order is to be
viewed as an overturning decision based on appellate
order, then the normal considerations that are utilized
in

deciding

whether

a

decision

should

be

applied

retroactively or prospectively would be followed.
In that regard, it was stated in Loyal Order of
Moose No. 259 v. County Bd., 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982):
Ordinarily an overruling decision
has retroactive operation. State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company v. Farmers
Insurance, 27 Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d
1002 (1972) (language appears there as
dicta). Retroactive operation occurs,
to some degree, whenever a case is
applied in any manner to control the
legal consequences flowing from fact
situations which arose at a point
earlier than the announcement of the
new rule. The application may be to
parties and facts of the case where
the new rule is announced, to pending
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cases, to future-initiated cases
arising from earlier events, or in some
rare instances to terminated cases
which are subject to collateral attack...
Constitutional law neither requires
nor prohibits retroactive operation
of an overruling decision. A
decision's operative effect is
treated as a function of judicial
policy rather than judicial power...
In other words, the extent of the
decision's application is left to the
discretion of the court...
Where overruled law has been
justifiably relied upon or where
retroactive operation creates a
burden, the Court, in its discretion,
may prohibit retroactive operation of
the overruling decision. State Farm
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers
Insurance, supra. In such instances,
prospective operation of a court
decision has long been applied.
And in Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 (Ut. App.
1988) it was held that whether retroactive application
should occur depends on whether "a substantial injustice
would otherwise occur" or whether the prior law "had been
justifiably relied on or a burden would be created".
See also VanDvke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1991,
whether "retroactive operation of the new law may
otherwise create an undue burden" (at 1025) and Heslop v.
Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) which applied a
"substantial injustice" standard (at 835).
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With either approach, the trial Court has discretion
to decide the effective date and has exercised that
discretion in this case to prevent an injustice or create
an unreasonable burden.
POINT II
MRS. CHAMBERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED
HER FULL REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES.
In the original Chambers, supra, the Court of
Appeals quoted the trial Court's finding with respect to
attorney fees wherein the Court awarded Mrs. Chambers an
additional $10,000.00 to be added to the $12,500.00
already

paid by Mr. Chambers

reimbursement

of

her

to assist

estimated

in partial

$58,050.00

attorney

fees.8
The Court of Appeals indicated that the trial Court
failed to address the reasonableness of the fees and
stopped short of finding that each party would have the
means to pay their own fees out of the money being
distributed to both.

Accordingly, the award of partial

attorney fees was reversed with the direction that the
trial Court reconsider this issue "under the standards
announced in Bell".

(At page 844)

8

This was another area where Mrs. Chambers wanted to present
additional evidence following remand. Her attorney fees in fact
ended up in excess of $90,000.00 and her expert witness fees were
in excess of $45,000.00.
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The standards announced in Bell v. Bellr 810 P.2d
489 (Utah App. 1991), require the Court to consider and
include in the findings factors such as:
A.

The difficulty of the litigation.

B.

The efficiency of the attorneys.

C.

The reasonableness of the number of hours
spent.

D.

The customary fee and the locality.

E.

The amount involved in the case.

F.

The result attained.

G.

The attorneys' expertise and experience.

H.

To justify an award of the amount claimed.

At the hearing on June 7, 1993, Mrs. Chambers
requested the Court to have the opportunity to have her
trial counsel appear and testify with greater clarity
concerning

the Bell

standards.

It was

suggested,

however, that her lawyer had prepared an Affidavit with
his detailed attorney fee request and was prepared to
testify if necessary.

It was the Court that suggested

that testimony not be taken and that Mr. Chambers'
counsel accept the Affidavit as to what Mr. Dolowitz
would testify to if called and then the Court could make
specific findings concerning the appropriate factors.
(See trial transcript, volume 2, pp. 160-161;
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June 7, 1993 hearing pp. 26-28, 56-57•)
In the Court's July 12, 1993 Memorandum Decision,
the

Court

standards.

attempted

to

address

each

of

the

Bell

Although the Court did not articulate them

one by one, it did comment upon the difficulty of the
litigation,

the

amount

in

controversy

and

the

reasonableness of the time and charges incurred.
(R - 735)
With respect to Mr. Chambers' ability, the Court
found that he had a multiple million dollar income and
resources that put him in a much superior position to
assist with the fees. (R - 736)
With respect to needf the Court said:
It is clear with the distribution of
almost a million and a half dollars
in assets, that the plaintiff could
pay her own attorney. Howeverf the
Court was concerned about the
necessity of her being able to
maintain an appropriate investment
base. I was aware that there would
be substantial inroads into that base
by reason of taxes, the debt owed by
her family (which is likely
uncollectible), court costs, witness
fees, attorney fees, etc. In the
interest of her being able to maintain
a base sufficient to provide an
appropriate income, I felt she needed
some assistance with the fees . . .
Based upon the above considerations,
I find that the plaintiff has need
of assistance with her attorney fees.
(R - 735)
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The issue of attorney fees was argued again at the
February 28, 1994 hearing. The Court was reminded of the
language of the July Memorandum Decision and the Court
declined any further modification or elaboration with
respect to the issue of attorney fees. (T -36-38)
Since the assets awarded Mrs. Chambers were to be
utilized, at least in the Court's mind, to justify the
amount of the alimony awarded and its reduction after
three years, the Court was correct in determining that
she needed assistance with her attorney fees by not
requiring her to make further inroads on those assets
awarded to her, thereby depleting her ability to use
those assets for her own purposes.

Mr. Chambers was

awarded an equal amount of assets, but maintained a
monthly

income

several

times

that

which

would

be

available to Mrs. Chambers.
Given these findings, the only real issue should be
why the full award of attorney fees was not granted.
As stated in Bell, supra, the Court must justify
anything less than a full award of attorney fees.
was not done.

This

If a partial award of attorney fees is

granted, the Court must provide a specific finding as to
why the award was partial.

See Haumont v. Haumont,
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793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990) and Muir v. Muir,
841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 1992).
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Mrs. Chambers is requesting attorney fees on appeal.
Where the trial Court has awarded attorney fees and the
receiving spouse prevails on the main issues, attorney
fees are generally awarded on appeal. Believing that she
should prevail on the issues raised here, Mrs. Chambers
is

requesting

reimbursement

for

the

attorney

fees

incurred in the preparation and presentation of this
appeal.

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah App.

1993); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah App.
1992); Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 967 (Utah App. 1994).
CONCLUSION
This case

should

be remanded

once

again with

directions to the trial Court to conduct a hearing to
adequately address the needs and circumstances of
Mrs. Chambers and to fashion an alimony award that would
provide her a true and equitable standard of living. At
a minimum, the previously ordered alimony should be
restored to her.

She should also be awarded her full
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request for attorney fees.
DATED this

yQ

day of September, 1994.
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Plaintiff,
Appellant and CrossAppellee
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
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ADDENDUM
A copy of the Decree of Divorce.
A copy of the July 12, 1993 Memorandum Decision*
A copy of the November 19, 1993 Supplemental
Decision.
A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order on Remand.
A copy of plaintiff's trial exhibit 11.
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No.
of and
for
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys
for
Plaintiff

0899)

525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
ERIN JO CHAMBERS,

)
)

Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

)

v.

)

THOMAS D. CHAMBERS,

)
)
)
oooOooo

Defendant,

Civil No. 890901927
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

The above-entitled matter came before the court, the
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor presiding, for trial on August 28,
August 29, August 30 and August 31, 1990.

The plaintiff was

present in person and represented by counsel David

S. Dolowltz

of

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C The defendant was present in person
and represented by counsel Mark J.
FEOLA,

P. C.

and Pete

N.

Vlabos

Roberts,

Esquire of SMITH, &

of VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT.

Prior to

the commencement of trial, the parties presented to the court, a
Stipulation

to provide for the custody and visitation of the minor

children of the parties which can be added to or changed by the
mental health professionals with consent of the parties.
The court then heard the parties and the witnesses on
their

behalf,

reviewed

the

exhibits

received

into evidence,

considered

the

arguments

and proffers

of counsel,

heard the

Stipulation

into which the parties entered into in regard to their

property in terms of valuation and distribution on August 31, 1990,
and being thus advised in the premises, and having made and entered
its Findings
IT

1.

of

Fact

and Conclusions

of

Law,

IS

HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

now,

This court has jurisdiction over the parties, the

subject matter of this action and the minor children of the
parties.
2.

Each of the parties is awarded a Decree

of

Divorce

The Decree

of

Divorce

from the other terminating their marriage.
shall become final upon entry.
3.

Three (3) children have been born as issue of this

marriage, to-wit:

Erica, age 10, born July 12, 1980; Skyler, age

7, born August 8, 1983; Megan, age 4, born April 21, 1986.
4.

The children shall reside with Erin Chambers and

shall be under her day-to-day control.

Parenting issues which

require a decision by both Erin Chambers and Tom Chambers shall be
effected only through Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent.
5.

The

children shall visit with Tom Chambers as

hereinafter set out.

If any visit is not utilized as set out, it

is lost and not made up.
a.

While Tom Chambers is in Utah and not engaged
in his profession as a professional basketball
player, he shall have the right to visit with
the children every other weekend from Friday
2
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at 5: 00 p. m. until Sunday at 7: 00 p. m. ;
b.

During the basketball season when Tom
Chambers is practicing his profession as a
professional basketball player, he shall be
entitled to two weekend visits per month in
Phoenix Arizona.

These shall run from Friday

after school until Sunday at 7: 00 p. m. by
which time the children shall be at the Salt
Lake International Airport to conclude the
visit.
of

four

ThoM» visits shall require a minimum
days

notice.

If

notice

is

not

provided four days in advance, the visit shall
not take place.

The visit shall be at Tom

Chamber' s expense and the children shall be
accompanied by an adult while traveling to and
from Salt Lake City and Phoenix;
c.

Tom Chambers shall be entitled to visit with
the children for four days after Christmas and
before New Year' s Eve during the Christmas
vacation from school.

The four days shall be

designated by him no later than two weeks in
advance or this visit shall not occur;
d

During the summer, Tom Chambers shall be
entitled

to

two,

two week

visits

upon

providing a minimum of three weeks advance
notice to Erin Chambers.
3

That advance notice
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shall specify the time and place he shall pick
up the children and shall return the children;
e.

There may be visits on unanticipated/special
occasions

about which

the parties

mutually

agree;
f.

Both parties shall use the other as "babysitter of choice" when the party with whom the
children are staying need short-term care.

6,

Tom

Clifford Hilton.
Divorce,

Chambers

shall

engage

in

therapy

with

Dr.

This therapy is a condition of this Decree

of

and if he does not follow through with the therapy, it

shall be grounds for setting aside the child custody and visitation
portions of this Decree
before the court.

of

Divorce

and bringing the matter back

The therapy visits shall take place weekly in

Ogden while Tom Chambers is in Utah during the off-season and
regularly

by

telephone

playing season.

at

Dr.

Hilton' s discretion

during

the

Erin Chambers shall pursue and comply with her

current treatment plan or its equivalent.
The children shall continue in therapy with Dr. Janice
Sargent, who shall work with the minor children of the parties and
Erin Chambers as is necessary to facilitate the communication issue
and such other issues as Dr. Sargent and Dr. Hilton determine must
be

addressed

relationship

in

terms

between

Erin

Chambers and the children.

of

working

Chambers

through

and

the

a

parent-child

children

and

Tom

Tom Chambers shall pay any uninsured

expenses of this therapy.
4
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Each parent, Tom Chambers and Erin Chambers, shall not
scrutinize the parenting actions of the other.

This is a general

admonition and when questions arise in their minds regarding the
actions that the other has taken, these shall not be addressed to
the children or to the other parent, but shall be addressed to Dr.
Hilton and Dr. Sargent and shall be addressed by the parties only
with the assistance of Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent.
Each of the parents, Tom Chambers and Erin Chambers, are
enjoined and prohibited from denigrating the other to the children
or quizzing the children about any actions taken by the other
during visitation or residence.

Any such questions should be

addressed to Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent.
7.

This matter shall come back before the court for

further review either in one year or at the direction of the
treating therapists, Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent should it be
necessary prior to that time.
8.

Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent shall consult with

each other, the parties and the children as they deem necessary to
assist in resolution of the communication problems between the
parties.

All costs of their services not paid by insurance shall

by paid by Tom Chambers.
9.

The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff

alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per month for a period of three
years commencing November 1, 1990.

In November of 1993, the

alimony award shall decrease to the sum of $5,000.00 per month
which shall be paid for an additional three years subject to the
5

terms of the decree upon the payment of the alimony payment due in
October of 1996, alimony shall cease.

In the event that the

plaintiff dies, remarries, or cohabits during the time that the
alimony is being paid to her, it shall terminate.
10.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff for the

support and maintenance of the children of the minor parties the
sum of $1, 500. 00 per month per child, for a total of $4, 500. 00 per
month as child support.

Said support to continue for each child

until that child attains majority and graduates from

high school

with his or her regularly scheduled class provided however that the
court shall retain jurisdiction to consider at the time that each
of the older two (2) children attain majority whether the decrease
in child support per child for the remaining children or child
should be a full $1, 500. 00 per month at the time each child attains
majority or a lesser sum under the then existing circumstances of
the parties.

It is acknowledged that defendant is paying child

support in the amount of three (3) times higher than the maximum
child support amount set forth by the child support schedule for
three (3) children, and the higher amount is justified in allowing
the children to share in the relative affluence of the defendant.
11.

The defendant shall maintain such health, accident

and dental insurance as is available to him through his employment
for the minor children of the parties, and shall pay all uninsured
medical, dental, eye care and orthodontic expenses by or on behalf
of the children.
12.

The defendant shall take all steps necessary to be
6
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certain that the plaintiff is able to secure her COBRA benefits to
health insurance from the NBA for insurance protection for 3 6
months after the entry of this Decree.

All such medical insurance

premiums and expenses shall be paid by plaintiff.
13.

While there are substantial assets that are being

distributed, it appears to the court that plaintiff is concerned
about some kind of guaranteed future income.

The defendant has

secured retirement benefits through the NBA.

These shall be

divided between the parties by an appropriate, qualified, domestic
relations order (QDRO) which shall be entered after this Decree
Divorce

has been finalized and accepted by the court.

of

If there is

an immediate rollover available under the NBA plan that shall be
If r.-;-r RT • division of the defendant' s account is

effected.
required tc

ettect*

by future distribution, it shall be divided

according to the formula articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in
the decision of Woodward vs.

Woodward, P^tf P. 2d( 43 1 (Utah 1982) in

which plaintiff would be entitled to one-half (1/2) of the pension
proceeds accumulated during the years the parties wer

married

during the time the pension was being accumulated.
14.

The plaintiff is awarded all of the furniture,

fixtures, furnishings and appliances located in the North Ogden
home in which she resides with her children at the time of trial.
15.

The defendant is awarded all of the furniture,

fixtures, furnishings and appliances located in the home he is
renting in Phoenix, the condomini urn i n Eden, Utah and the cabin.
T n. addition, he is awarded the bookends and Bev Doolittle book
7

I't&t

which are presently in the possession of the plaintiff.
16.

Each of the parties is ordered to make available the

home videos and pictures which they have in their possession for
copying by the other.
17.

The plaintiff is awarded the 11. 4% Washington State

bonds, her checking account in Zions National Bank, the obligation
from Ray Ward for $100,000.00, the obligation from Scott and Kerry
Hall of $6,000.00, the Jeep Cherokee she is driving, the 1986
Chaparelle boat valued at $5,000.00 and one-half of the All Terrain
vehicles.
18.

The defendant is awarded his First Interstate bank

account, his Zions First National Bank account, the leasehold
improvements on his Phoenix home, the land in Pleasant View, Utah,
the 200 acre parcel of mountain property, the approximately 95
acres of mountain property, the North Ogden horse property, the
Mercedes-Benz

automobile, the CJ-7 Jeep, one-half of the All

Terrain vehicles, the four-horse trailer, the three-horse trailer,
the All Terrain vehicle trailer, the GMC pickup truck, the tractor,
the horses and mules, the interest in the race horse and the cabin
and property of the parties.
19.

To equalize the division of property between the

parties, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of

8

$377,892.00 [which includes the payments described in paragraphs 22
and 23(e)] from his one-half of the annuities or their proceeds if
those must be cashed in upon receipt of those funds.

This payment

is governed by §1041 of the Internal Revenue Code.
20.

The defendant has earned compensation from Seattle

Supersonics, for which he has provided all of his services which
compensation has been deferred.

These payments are due in February

of 1991, February of 1992 and February of 199 3

These payments

shall be divided equally between the parties. If, under Washington
community property law, each of the parties may be paid one-half of
these payments and the tax consequences of those payments borne by
the

party

receiving

those

monies, then they

shall

be paid

accordingly and this Decree specifically adopts and applies that
Washington State Community Property law.

If, however, under

Washington State Community Property Law, these deferred payments
are considered payment to the defendant and are earned income by
him, he shall pay one-half of the gross proceeds of each payment to
the plaintiff.

This shall be considered for tax purposes, a § 71

(IRC) alimony payment. It shall be tax deductible to the defendant
and taxable income in t lie plaintiff.
he non-modifiable.

This alimony provision shall

If these payments, for any reason cannot be

treated as set forth above and taxed to the recipient as described,
then the defendant shall pay the taxes that are due on these
payments, then pay one-half of the proceeds after the appropriate
tax payments have been made to the plaintiff and the receipt by the
plaintiff of these funds shall be considered
9

a § 1041

(IRC)

Property Distribution.
21.

The defendant shall receive payments of $133,333.00

in the month of September of 1990 and the month of October, 1990
from the Phoenix Suns.

The defendant shall pay the regular

withholding taxes from these sums at the same rate that he has paid
for the preceding months of 1990.

After those taxes have been

withheld, the net sum remaining which the parties believe will be
approximately $80,000.00, is to be paid one-half to each party upon
receipt of those funds by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff s receipt

of her one-half of these funds shall be as a § 1041 (IRC) Property
Distribution.
22.

Plaintiff acknowledges receipt of these payments.
The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $115,000.00

in October of 1990 as a § 1041 (IRC) property distribution as
settlement of her claim for dissipation of the marital estate and
celebrity good will, fame and publicity, defendant' s contract
extension value, if any, promotional and complimentary items and
basketball camps.

This payment shall be made upon receipt of the

annuity or funds from the annuities by the Defendant as described
in paragraph 23(e) herein.
23.

The following property shall be divided equally

between the parties upon receipt or as soon as possible.
a.

The

payment

due

on the

Nike

contract

of

$5, 000. 00 after deduction by the defendant of
the regular income tax withholding from that
payment.

That portion of this payment paid to

the Plaintiff shall be considered a § 1041
10
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(IRC) Division of Property.
b.

The proceeds from the sale of the Bucklin
Trust.

The parties agree to divide equally

the liabilities relating thereto.
c.

The debt due on the Hall Woodway Investment
($43, 125. 00)and all expenses and liabilities
relating

thereto

and

the

Hall

Woodway

Investment itself.
d.

The

proceeds,

liabilities

and

expenses

resulting from tiitj Crenshaw loan/investment.
e.

The $840,000.00 approximate gross worth of
annuities due in October of 1'MM)

from the

Seattle Superbunics, provided if these can be
divided equally so that each of the parties
receives one-half and eacl .if f hi. parties may
deal

th their own tax consequences under the

State of Washington' s Community Property I.HW,
that shall be effected;

i i

not, then the

defendant shall have withheld his regular tax,
his regular withholding tax on these annuities
or payments and the annuities received, shall
divided

equally

provided,

however,

annuities,

the

between
on

defendant

plaintiff's one-half

the

parties,

receipt

the

shall

pay

the

(1/2) and then pay to

plaintiff the $115,000.00 described ritinve to
11
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be considered a § 1041 (IRC) distribution of
property to her.
On receipt of the annuities or funds by
the

defendant

and

after

payment

to

the

plaintiff of her one-half of these annuities
or funds, defendant shall immediately make
payment

to

plaintiff

of

the

$115,000.00

hereinabove described under paragraph 23 which
sum is included in the $377,892.00 described
in paragraph 19 above,
f.

The

home

in

North

Ogden,

Utah

and

the

condominium in Eden, Utah, shall be sold as
soon as practical and the net proceeds of sale
divided between the parties.

The parties

shall mutually agree upon a sales agent and
shall hold title in both properties as tenants
in common.

Pending the sale of the Ogden home

and Eden condominium, defendant will pay the
mortgage,

taxes,

insurance,

repairs,

maintenance and homeowner7 s association fees
relating

thereto

subject

conditions:

With respect

Ogden,

one-half

Utah

to

the

following

to the home in

(1/2)

of

all

net

proceeds, if any, will be distributed to the
parties after all costs of sale have been
deducted and defendant is reimbursed for all
12
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expenses incurred relating to the house paid
by the defendant up to the total proceeds.

If

the property is rented, there will be an
appropriate credit for the amount of rent
received until the property is sold.

With

respect to the condominium in Eden, Utah, onehalf

(1/2)

of

all

the

proceeds

will

be

distributed to the parties after all costs of
sale have been deducted and defendant has been
reimbursed for all principal reductions made
by virtue of defendant' s payments relating to
the condominium

from and after August 31,

1990.
The plaintiff and defendant each shall receive
one (1) share in the houseboat.

The1 plaintiff

shall receive the 1986 Chaparelle boat valued
at $5, 000. 00.
The proceeds from the Life USA annuity.
The BulJgei Basin investment and all expenses
and disclosed liabilities relating thereto.
The

Players

Athletic

investment

and

all

expenses and liabilities disclosed prior to
August 31, 1990 relating thereto.
The

Triaxel

stock

and

a)\

expenses

and

liabilities relating thereto disclosed prior
to August 31, 1990.
13
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24.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of

$10,000.00 to assist her in payment of her attorney's fees.

If

this sum is paid within thirty-five days, this obligation shall be
satisfied.

If

not,

upon

the

filing

by

the

plaintiff

of

an

affidavit stating that these have not been paid, then judgment is
hereby entered automatically by operation of the filing of that
affidavit in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for
the sum of $10,000.00.
25.

As properties which are divided are in the name of

and under the control of the defendant prior to their division, the
defendant shall have the duty and he is ordered to give plaintiff
names, telephone numbers and addresses of contact people on all
properties awarded to plaintiff.
26.

All

joint

credit

card/charge

accounts

shall

be

closed and charges incurred shall be the responsibility of the
party incurring the charge.
27.

If the defendant becomes delinquent in his child

support obligation in an amount at least equal to child support
payable for one month, then the plaintiff is entitled to mandatory
income withholding relief, pursuant to section 30-3-5-1 and 62A-11403 (1953) as amended).
apply

to

defendant

existing
is

and

no longer

This income withholding procedure shall
future

payors

obligated

until

to pay

such

child

time

support

as

the

to the

plaintiff.
28. Each party is ordered to take all actions required
to implement the terms of this Decree

14

of Divorce

and to cooperate

1 /44
with the other in signing all deeds and documents necessary to
implement this Decree.

Should any action be required to enforce

the provisions of this Decree

of Divorce,

the party determined to

have failed or refused to have complied with the provisions of the
Decree

of Divorce

shall be assessed and required to pay the costs

and attorney fees incurred in securing compliance with the Decree

of

Divorce.
DATED this

j / / day of / / ^ ^

, 1990.

BY THE

Third Di

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

APPROVED AS REFLECTING THE
RULING OF THE COURT:

I
f

St

OfTh.Oriiin»IOn^ifeinMyOffic5 , t
DATEDTH,S 4 ^ ! & Q ^ j Q ^ , ^

£>

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Plaintiff

MARK ROBENS
Attorney-) for Defendant

^PEftER VI£
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ERIN JO CHAMBERS,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
vs .
THOMAS CHAMBERS

Case No. 890901927
Defendants.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded this case to this
court outlining three areas for the court's reconsideration. Those
three areas were alimony, division of retirement and an award of
attorneys fees.
In this case there is no question that in considering the
preferences established in Woodward (656 P2d 431), the facts would
favor a present division of the retirement because the present
value is determinable and there are sufficient assets in the estate
to allow such a division. I have personally felt that there should
be a strong preference favoring a division which would assure a
non-working spouse with a secure independent retirement income.
However I defer to the wisdom and law established by "Woodward" and
award the Defendant his retirement upon payment by him of one half
its present value ($32,379.46) to the Plaintiff.
the

past

there

have

retroactive effect.

been

enhancements

to

In addition, in
the

plan

having

If there are enhancements taking effect after

i

Erin Jo Chambers v. Thomas Chambers
Case No. 890901927
Page Two
the time of the trial of this matter, then the Plaintiff shall be
entitled to her share of that enhancement based upon the Woodward
formula.
In reconsidering the alimony award in the original decree, it
occurs to me that there were miscalculations.
Plaintiff's

exhibit

11 correctly

reflected

I found that

the needs

of the

Plaintiff and her children at about $10,000 per month. That amount
fails to consider her additional need of health and accident
insurance

(previously provided by the Defendant) and money to

offset her tax liability for her receipt of alimony.

I recognized

that there were substantial children's expenses involved in the
exhibit

11 needs assessment, but felt that expense would be:

approximately offset by the fact that the child support nearly
equaled the amount of children's' expense alleged on exhibit 11 and
the $4500 child support was included in the income calculations.
In recalculating the alimony, if we accept the expenses of
exhibit 11 and add the expense of health and accident insurance and
taxes on the alimony paid, and then deduct the child support^ that
means the Plaintiff has need of about $7000 to maintain her prior
standard of living.
This ruling does not factor in any consideration of the
Plaintiff's ability to provide for herself or money received as
returns on investments from assets awarded as a part of the

Erin Jo Chambers vs. Thomas Chambers
Case No. 890901927
Page Three

property division.

It is the intent of the court that the

Plaintiff should have the initial three years as a rehabilitative
period to:

marshall her assets, learn to invest appropriately,

make decisions about her future, prepare for future employment,
become settled, etc.

Thereafter the court adopts as its finding,

paragraphs 10 and 11 from the Defendant's Supplemental Findings of
Fact, etc. relating to the Plaintiff's ability to care for herself,
and

based upon that finding imputes income to the Plaintiff of

$736 per month.
The Plaintiff received as her share of the property division
$1,479,578.

Realistically it would not be fair to consider that:

figure as her investment base. There are obviously attorneys' fees
and costs of the proceeding as well as taxes to pay, etc. She has
also requested that we deduct from her investment base her purchase
of a home and the debt by her family.

It would not be appropriate

to allow the Plaintiff to remove the home from her investment base
and also allow her to claim rent expense of over $1000 per month.
Figuring a 4% return on her investment base, the imputed
income of $736, and the child support, the alimony award should be
reduced at the end of three years to $3000 per month.
I had previously ordered termination of alimony at the end of
three years.

That decision was based on the fact that when the

Defendant is through with basketball his ability to produce income

Chambers v. Chambers
Case No.
Page Four
is frankly no better than the Plaintiffs.

His present earning

ability is based strictly upon his status^a professional athlete.
In retrospect

that is not entirely correct, for it fails to

consider

income

the

he

will

earn

in

the

meantime.

His

investmentbase, considering his interim income, should exceed hers
by several times, giving him by far a superior ability to provide
on-going assistance.
The

alimony

then

should

not

terminate

except

upon

the

occurrence of remarriage, death etc.
The

final

issue

attorneys' fee award.

requiring

consideration

is

that

of the

The stipulation at trial, as the court

understood it, was that if Mr. Dolowitz were called to testify, he
would verify the material contained in Plaintiff's exhibit 17 ai.d
express

the

opinion

that

the

time

and

costs

involved

were

reasonable taking into account the complexity and seriousness of
the issues involved.

The Defendant did not stipulate the charges

or time were reasonable, but only that would be Mr. Dolowitz fs
testimony.
The exhibit

(17) contained a summary sheet of the gross

charges, a breakdown of the hourly rate of persons

from Mi .

Dolowitz's office working upon the Plaintiff's case, a monthly
summary of charges, times, and persons, and finally a day-by-day
account of date, attorney, service description, hours and charge

^ -

Chambers v. Chambers
Case No.
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(amount). In considering the complexity of the issues, the number
of

hearings,

the

conferences, the

resolution

of

issues, the

animosity between the parties, the amounts of money and property,
etc., the court believes the charges were not unreasonable.
The second issue relates to the fact that the Defendant with
a multiple Million Dollar income clearly has the ability to assist
the Plaintiff with her attorneys fees.

In fact in a comparison of

the resources of the two parties he is in a much superior position.
The final prong of the "Bell" (810 P2d 489) analysis relates
to the ability of the Plaintiff to pay her own attorneys1 fees.
It is clear with the distribution of almost a million and a half
dollars in assets, that the Plaintiff could pay her own attorney.
However the court was concerned about the necessity of her being
able to maintain an appropriate investment base.

I was aware

that

there would be substantial inroads into that base by reason of
taxes, the debt owed by her family (which is likely uncollectible),
court costs, witness' fees , attorneys' fees, etc. In the interest
of her being able to maintain a base sufficient to provide an
appropriate income, I felt she needed some assistance with the
fees.

I ruled the attorneys1 fees previously paid, have been paid

with marital assets not to be considered in the final distribution,
and awarded her an additional $10,000 to apply to her attorneys'
fees.

Based upon the above considerations I find that the

io O
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Plaintiff has need of assistance with her attorneys1 fees.
I have referred above to the debt to her family, which is
probably not collectable.

There was some dispute at trial about

whose idea the loan was and to whom it should be assigned.
Iawarded it to the Plaintiff because it was to her family and
because I believed that she had some influence in the decision
process. There is likewise no question that the Defendant also had
some responsibility for that decision.

While it is not my intent

to revisit that issue, I think it appropriate to point out that the
reduction

in her investment base was contributed

to by that

obligation and that is an equitable factor considered by the court.
Dated this

C/

of July, 1993.

couwrrOF
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ERIN JO CHAMBERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
|
|
]!

SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM

NOV 1 9 jccj

]
i

THOMAS D. CHAMBERS,
Defendant.

Case No.

890901927

]

In the courts reconsideration of alimony in response to
an

order

of

the

appellate

court,

I had

failed

to

specify

disposition of the overpayment from the time of the original decree
to the time of the order of the Court of Appeals.
Upon reflection, that failure may have been a result of
a subconscience desire to not address the issue in hopes it would
go away.
To require the Plaintiff to repay those overpayments
would seriously affect her ability to maintain her standard of
living.
It would undermine further her investment base to a very
serious extent.

In addition, in dividing the estate, we had

awarded to her an obligation of her family which at this point
seems unlikely to be collected. The decision to loan the money to
the plaintiff's brother appears to have been a joint decision. The

t ^0

Supplemental Memo
Case No, 890901927
Page 2
diminution of her estate by both the loan and repayment of alimony
based upon the courts mistake, somehow seems unfair.
The Court accordingly declines to order repayment based
upon the equities of property division, earning ability, etc.

w

I hereby certify that on the f^r^
I sent a true and correct copy of the
Memorandum to counsel as follows:

day of November, 1993,
foregoing Supplemental

Mark J. Robens, Esq.
MARISCAL, WEEKS, McINTYRE
& FRIEDLANDER
201 West Coolidge Street
Phoenix, AZ 85013
Brian R. Florence
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON
818 26th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
Pete N. Vlahos
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401

•W^Jl

Brian R. Florence
#1091
of FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON
Attorney for Plaintiff
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
399-9291 - / FAX 399-9333
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ERIN JO CHAMBERS,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER ON REMAND *i K£ 2

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 890901927
Hon. Stanton M. Taylor

THOMAS D. CHAMBERS,
Defendant.
BACKGROUND

On October 21, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals filed
its decision on the earlier appeal of this case.

See

Chambers v. Chambers, 198 U.A.R. 49 (Utah App. 1992).
After remand, the matter was placed on the Court's
calendar for a scheduling conference for January 19, 1993.
The parties, through their respective counsel, appeared
before the Court on that day, at which time the defendant,
through his counsel, filed with the Court a Memorandum on
Remand

and

proposed

Supplemental

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro
Tunc.

Defendant's Memorandum contended that sufficient

evidence existed in the record to support

supplemental

Findings, Conclusions and Amended Decree of Divorce and that
no further hearing should be necessary.
The Court gave plaintiff additional time to respond to

CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS
Civil No. 890901927
Findings, Conclusions, Order
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defendant's Memorandum and provisionally scheduled the matter
for trial on June 24, 1993.
On February

17, 1993f

the plaintiff, through her

counsel, filed a Response to Memorandum and thereafter the
Court scheduled a hearing for argument which was held
June 7, 1993. The parties, through their respective counsel,
presented their positions. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the Court announced that it felt sufficient facts existed in
the record to permit the Court to supplement its findings in
conformance with the directions of the Court of Appeals,
canceled the trial date and took the matter under advisement.
On July 9, 1993, the Court issued its Memorandum
Decision.
On July 13, 1993, the plaintiff, through her counsel,
asked the Court for some further clarification with respect
to its decision, which clarification was provided by letter
from the Court dated July 16, 1993.
On September 15, 1993, the parties' counsel met with
the Court requesting additional clarification regarding the
FLORENCE
AND
HUTCHISON

effective date of the reduction of alimony.
that

matter

under

further

advisement

The Court took

and

issued

its

enters

the

Supplemental Memorandum on November 19, 1993.
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With

this

background,

the

Court

now

following:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded this

case to this Court outlining three areas for the Court's
reconsideration. Those three areas were alimony, division of
retirement and an award of attorney fees.
2.

In this case, there is no question that in

considering

the preferences

established

in Woodward

v.

Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the facts would favor a
present division of the retirement because the present value
is determinable and there are sufficient assets in the estate
to allow such a division. The Court has personally felt that
there should be a strong preference favoring a division which
would assure a non-working spouse with a secure independent
retirement income, but the Court defers to the wisdom and law
established by Woodward.
3. In reconsidering the alimony award in the original
Decree, it occurs that there were miscalculations.
4.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 correctly reflected the

needs of the plaintiff and her children at about $10,000.00
RENCE
ND
;HISON
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per month.

That amount failed to consider her additional

need of health and accident insurance (previously provided by
the defendant) and money to offset her tax liability for her
receipt of alimony.
5.

The Court

recognized

there

were

substantial

CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS
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children's

expenses

involved

in

the

Exhibit

11

needs

assessment, but those expenses would be approximately offset
by the fact that the child support nearly equalled the amount
of children's expense alleged on Exhibit 11 and the $4,500.00
child support was included in the income calculations.
6.

In recalculating the alimony, if the Court accepts

the expenses of Exhibit 11 and adds the expenses of health
and accident insurance and taxes on the alimony paid and then
deducts the child support, that means the plaintiff has need
of about $7,000.00 to maintain her prior standard of living.
7.

The

estimated

$7,000.00

for

the plaintiff

to

maintain her prior standard of living does not factor into
any consideration of the plaintiff's ability to provide for
herself or money received as returns on investments from
assets awarded to her as part of the property division.
8.
should

It was the intent of the Court that the plaintiff

have the initial three years as a

rehabilitative

period to:
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A.

Martial her assets;

B.

Learn to invest appropriately;

C.

Make decisions about her future;

D.

Prepare for future employment;

E.

Become settled, etc.

9.

In the Court's reconsideration of alimony in the

CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS
Civil No. 890901927
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Memorandum Decision issued July 9, 1993, the Court failed to
specify the disposition of the over-payment of alimony from
the time of the original Decree to the Order of the Court of
Appeals.

Upon reflection, that failure may have been a

result of a subconscious desire to not address the issues in
hopes it would go away.

To require the plaintiff to repay

those over-payments would seriously affect her ability to
maintain her standard of living.

It would undermine further

her investment base to a very serious extent.

In addition,

in dividing the estate, we had awarded to her an obligation
of her family which at this point
collected.
brother

seems unlikely to be

The decision to loan the money to plaintiff's

appears

to

have

been

a

joint

decision.

The

diminution of her estate by both the loan and repayment of
alimony based on the Court's mistake, somehow seems unfair.
10.
trial.

Plaintiff was thirty years of age at the time of

She testified that she had two and one-half years of

college and that she held certain jobs previously, including
teaching dancing, working in window display and as a clerk at
>RENCE

ZCMI and a clerk at Stop & Shop.

CHISON

helped manage some apartments. Plaintiff also testified that
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she

had not made

outside

of

the

any attempts

house.

The

She also testified she

to obtain
evidence

any

also

employment

showed

that

plaintiff participated in many types of physical activities

%.- «w o
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and there were no reasons, health or otherwise, why plaintiff
could not be fully employed and contribute to her own needs.
Plaintiff could have found appropriate employment which would
provide at least a minimum wage income of $736.00 to assist
in providing her own needs.
11.

The plaintiff received as her share of the

property division $1,479,578.00. Realistically, it would not
be fair to consider that figure as her investment base.
There

were

obviously

attorney

fees

and

costs

of

the

proceeding, as well as taxes to pay, etc. The plaintiff has
requested

that we deduct

from her investment

base her

purchase of a home and the debt to her from her family.
12. It would not be appropriate to allow the plaintiff
to remove the home from her investment base and also allow
her to claim rent expense of over $1,000.00 per month.
13.

The Court figures with a four percent return on

her investment base, the imputed income of $736.00 and the
child support, the alimony should be reduced at the end of
three years to $3,000.00 per month.
FLORENCE
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terminated at the end of six years. That decision was based
on the

PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AT
LAW

818- 26TH STREET
OGDEN. UTAH 84401

The Court previously ordered the alimony to be

fact

that when the defendant was

through with

basketball, his ability to produce income is frankly no
better than the plaintiffs and his present earning ability is
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based strictly upon his status as a professional athlete.
15.

In retrospect, that is not entirely correct or it

fails to consider the income he will earn in the meantime.
His investment base, considering his interim income, should
exceed the plaintiff's by several times, giving him by far a
superior ability to provide on-going assistance.
16. The final issue requiring consideration is that of
the attorney fee award.

The stipulation at trial, as the

Court understood it, was that if Mr. Dolowitz were called to
testify,

he

would

verify

the

material

contained

in

plaintiff's Exhibit 17 and express the opinion that the time
and costs involved were reasonable taking into account the
complexity
defendant

and
did

reasonable,

seriousness of the issues involved.
not

but

stipulate

only

that

the
Mr.

charges
Dolowitz

or

time

would

The
were

testify

accordingly.
17.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 17 contained a summary sheet

of the gross charges, a breakdown of the hourly rate of
persons from Mr. Dolowitz's office working on the plaintiff's
ORENCE
AND
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case, a monthly summary of charges, times and persons and
finally

a day-by-day

account

of date, attorney,

service

description, hours and charge.
18.
number

of

In considering the complexity
hearings,

the

conferences,

the

of issues, the
resolution

of
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issues, the animosity between the parties, the amounts of
money and property, the Court believes the attorney

fee

charges were not unreasonable.
19.
the

An additional issue relating to attorney fees is

fact that the defendant with a multi-million

dollar

income clearly has the ability to assist the plaintiff with
her attorney fees and in comparison of the resources of the
two parties, he is in a much superior position.
20.

The final prong of the test established in Bell v.

Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) relates to the ability of
the plaintiff to pay her own attorney fees.

It is clear with

the distribution of almost a million and one-half dollars in
assets, the plaintiff could pay her own attorney.

However,

the Court was concerned about the necessity of her being able
to maintain an appropriate investment base.

The Court was

aware that there would be substantial inroad into that base
by reason of taxes, the debt owed by her family which is
likely uncollectible, court costs, witness fees, attorney
fees, etc.
FLORENCE
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21.

In the interest of the plaintiff being able to

maintain a base sufficient to provide an appropriate income,
she has need of some assistance with her attorney fees.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

1.

The defendant

is awarded

all of his NBA or

K)0
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basketball

related

retirements

subject

to

paying the

plaintiff one-half of the value in existence at the time of
the original divorce trial.

The value of the NBA Players

Pension Plan presented at the time of trial was $64,758.92,
one-half of which would belong to the plaintiff ($32,379.46) .
2.

In addition,

in the past

there

have

enhancements to the plan having retroactive effect.

been
If

enhancements have occurred since the time of the trial of
this matter, plaintiff shall be entitled to her share of any
such enhancements based on the Woodward formula. This shall
apply to any retirements existing at the time of the trial of
this matter.
3. A minimum wage income of $736.00 per month should
be imputed to the plaintiff.
4.

Based on the findings concerning the plaintiff's

return on her investment base, her imputed income as stated
above and the child support previously stipulated to and
ordered, plaintiff's alimony should be reduced to $7,000.00
per month effective with the Court's Memorandum Decision
3RENCE
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CHISON
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dated July 12, 1993, which shall continue for the balance of
the three-year rehabilitative period, after which the alimony
should be reduced to $3,000.00 per month.
5.

The alimony awarded herein should only terminate

upon the occurrence of remarriage, death or operation of law.

~J
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6.

Based on the findings above and the standards

established in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991),
the $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at the time of trial
is hereby affirmed.
ORDER
The Court

having

issued

its Findings

of Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant be and he is hereby
awarded all of his NBA or basketball related retirements
subject to paying the plaintiff one-half of the value in
existence at the time of the original divorce trial.

The

value of the NBA Players Pension Plan presented at the time
of trial was $64,758.92, one-half of which would belong to
the plaintiff ($32,379.46).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition, in the past
there have been enhancements to the plan having retroactive
effect.

If enhancements have occurred since the time of the

trial of this matter, plaintiff shall be entitled to her
share of any such enhancements based on the Woodward formula.
FLORENCE
AND
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This shall apply to any retirements existing at the time of
the trial of this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a minimum wage income of
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$736.00 per month shall be imputed to the plaintiff.
IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED

that based

on the

findings

c ~ ;t
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concerning the plaintiff's return on her investment base, her
imputed

income

as stated

above

and the child

support

previously stipulated to and ordered, plaintiffs alimony
shall be reduced to $7,000.00 per month effective with the
Court's Memorandum Decision dated July 12, 1993, which shall
continue for the balance of the three-year rehabilitative
period, after which the alimony shall be reduced to $3,000.00
per month.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the alimony awarded herein
shall only terminate upon the occurrence of remarriage, death
or operation of law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that based on the findings above
and the standards established in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489
(Utah App. 1991), the $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at
the time of trial is hereby affirmed.
Is
STATEi
COUNTYi

RNEYS AT
LAW

day of March, 1994.
BY THE COURT:
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NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
TO DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS COUNSEL:
Pursuant

to Rule

4-504 of the Code

of Judicial

Administration, you are hereby notified that the undersigned
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will hold the original hereof for a period of five days from
the date this notice is mailed to you to allow you sufficient
time to file any written objections to the form of the
foregoing with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned.
If no objections to the form are filed within that time, the
original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature
and filing.
DATED th3.s,-?Cl

t/

day of January, 1994.
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Plaintiff
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on Remand, postage prepaid, to the following at the
addresses listed on this /<^J—""day of January, 1994.
FLORENCE
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Pete N. Vlahos
Attorney for Defendant
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, UT
84401

Mark J. Robens
Attorney for Defendant
2901 N. Central Avenue #200
Phoenix, AZ
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CHAMBERS v CHAMBERS
PLAINTIFF' S PROPOSED SUPPORT
ny

1)
2)
3)

$14,060.00

1.

Living Expenses

$9, 997. 73

2.

Taxes due
(on $10, 000/mo)

4, 060. 60

See attached schedule
3 children as deductions
w/o 3 children - $4,261.70

(mcb/dsd/Chambers. ProStt)

SUMMARY PROJECTED MONTHLY EXPENSES

DATE:

August 28,
Rent

and

1990

Household

Children

- Included

$1,493.
on Plaintiff'

Charge

Cards,
Covering
Expenses
Clothing
Entertainment
Incidentals
Expenses

Food and
Health

8

Schedule

47

855. 00
3, 539. 55

for:

Supplies

850. 00
736. 20

Costs

Laundry

225. 00

Utilities

571.

54. 75

Insurance
Trans porta

297. 51

ti on

300. 00

Entertainment
Incidentals

(see

list

attached)

TOTAL PROJECTED MONTHLY EXPENSES:

CHAMBERS. EX6NHBI2

25

SI075.
S9

-

"7-

00
73

CHAMBERS Y. CHAMBERS

PTiATNnFF* S MONTHLY EXPENSES
DATE:

August

28,

1990

$1* 020.
26.
114.
50.
48.

00
50
97
00
00

RENT AND HOUSEHOLD: *
Rent/Mart
gage
Insurance
(1/12)
Property
Taxes
(1/12)
Repairs
Maintenance
/Yard
Care
Mai d/Cl eani n g

£_.- £ M L M
$1, ,493. 47

Subtotal:
CHARGE CARDS:
Zions - VISA
Bank of
America
Nordstrom
Weinstocks

$1, 000.
564.
1,576.
100.
S 300.

zcm
Subtotal:
FOOD AND
At

00
55
00
00
00

$3, 539. 55

SUPPLIES:

Home

$600. 00

Eating Out

&2SSLJ1SL

Subtotal:

$850.00

HEALTH COSTS fPlaintiff
and
(Defendant
has health
insurance
Bills
submitted
- non-covered
unknown)

Children):
expenses

Doctor
Dentist
Drugs /Prescription
Children
*Plaintiff
somewhat.

Subtotal:
is planning

$366. 00
50. 00
100. 00
S220.20
$736.20
to move - expenses

may

differ

LAUNDRY:
Laundry
Dry Cleaning

$25. 00
$200. 00

Subtotal:

$225. 00

SniMXUSS:
Telephone
Gas
Electric
Water & Sewer;
Garbage
(North Ogden City)

$400. 00
70. 00
75. 00
Collection
£ 26. 25

Subtotal:

$571.25

INSURANCE:
Auto
Medical
Life

and Hospital

(Paid

by Tom)

Subtotal:

$54. 75
?
^^^^
$54. 75

TRANSPORTATION:
Car
Payments
Gas and Oil
Repairs
License
and Tax
Car Wash
Subtotal:

1

Plaintiff
would like
Defendant
to be ordered
pay all
health
insurance
premiums
and expenses
insurance
because
of Plaintiff's
current
medical

$130.
50.
37.
& 80.

00
00
51
00

$297. 51

to continue
not covered
condition.

to
by

OTHER:

Income Tax Preparation
(Paid by Tom)
Entertainment
(additional
expenses
included
in charge card expenses
(Traveling)
Subtotal:

?
£300. 00
$300. 00

CHILDREN* S EXPENSES:
Books,
Reading
Material
Child
Care
Lessons,
Costumes,
Swimming,
Pre-School
(Megan)
School
Lunches

Baseball,

Soccer

Subtotal:

$40. 00
500. 00
200. 00
40. 00
$ 75.jm

$855. 00

INCIDENTALS:
Hair and Beauty Care
Subscriptions
(Books,
Magazines,
Newspapers)
Pets
Church or Synagogue
(10% of earnings)
Gifts
Hobbies
(needlepoint,
etc)
Subtotal:

CHAMBERS. £X7\HB#2

$125.
25.
75.
650.
100.
& 100.

00
00
00
00
00
00

$1, 075. 00

